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TITLE: Academisation: who now holds the key to the secret garden? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to demonstrate the hazard of an education system controlled by any one 
group, in this case governments, by examining the recent drive for the academisation of 
English state schools. This paper highlights the need for education’s independence from 
political control. The once ‘secret garden’ of the curriculum is now firmly in the government’s 
grasp. Academies were introduced in England in 2000 by the Labour government; originally 
called City Academies, they were claimed to break the cycle of underperformance and low 
expectation of failing inner city schools. But they are now promoted as the only means of 
providing ‘outstanding’ education. I argue that the current drive for academisation forms part 
of the market-oriented narrative that believes market forces offer the best solution to all the 
needs of society. As well as delivering substantial changes in governance and accountability, 
Academisation conceals a radical shift in education’s purpose, yet it is being pushed through 
without real debate. The academisation process offers an insight into how governments can 
and do use state apparatus to ignore, subvert, and diminish opposition. To highlight this, I use 








The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the hazard of an education system controlled by any 
one group, by examining successive British governments’ drive for the academisation of 
English state schools. This paper will highlight - through analysing aspects of the 
academisation process – how any ‘hegemonic group’ (politicians in the present case) with sole 
control can initiate and push through radical changes to education policy motivated by their 
ideological preferences. The paper illustrates how governments, as the hegemonic institution 
of power, rather than engaging in an open and transparent public debate, can utilise their 
power to dismiss and subvert opposition, as well as in Gramscian terms project their ideology 
upon the subordinated (those not aligned to the interests of the ruling elite) who come to see 
through false consciousness those interests as ‘common sense’ and ‘natural’, even though 
they do not reflect their best interests. It is acknowledged however, that education is 
inherently political; hegemonic elites such as the clergy, monarchy, politicians (and more 
recently corporations and philanthropists) have controlled and sought control of schooling 
and the content of the curricula in order to maintain their hegemony. 
 
I begin by providing an historical contextualisation of Academies, and then demonstrate the 
political ‘capture’ of education. The current drive for academisation arguably represents the 
most radical change put forward by any government since the 1902 Education Act, achieved 
without ‘real’ public debate, or clear evidence for the success of Academies. In the discussion 
I use Steven Lukes’ conceptualisation of power: the public, the hidden, and the invisible, to 
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analyse the influence of power in the academisation process, and the possible societal 
consequences of academisation. Arguably the academisation process also represents 
‘privatisation’ of schools through the back door; by privatisation I mean schools being run on 
corporate ethos and structures. However, although the paper speaks of a ‘secret’ privatisation 
of English state schools its purpose is not to explore whether schools should be privatised (on 




The UK has a parliamentary democracy but most of the power is concentrated de facto in the 
hands of the Executive: Parliament generally rubber stamps decisions of government and the 
promulgation of laws. Governments tightly control debates (with politicians ‘whipped into 
subservience’ (Jeffs and Smith, 2002). This is particularly discomfiting given that since 1945 no 
party in the UK has gained more than a 50% share of the vote (Kimber, 2012), and 
governments have been elected by a minority of the electorate. The situation is compounded 
because most citizens are largely passive and apathetic to the political process – behaving as 
an audience selecting from options provided by the elite, rather than participating in the 
formulation of policy and the decision-making process of government (Manin, 1997). Under 






There is much that has been written about Academies: their history and political context 
(Walford, 2014); evidence regarding their effectiveness (Angel Solutions Ltd, 2016; Beckett, 
2007; Briggs and Simons, 2014; Gorard, 2014; PwC, 2008; Worth, 2015); improving education 
provision through the extension of the market and the creation of diverse provision (Gunter 
and McGinity, 2014); comparative analysis with Swedish independent grant-maintained 
schools (West, 2014) and US Charter schools (Goldring and Mavrogordato, 2011); and social 
justice implications (Francis et al., 2014; Green et al., 2015; Perry and Francis, 2010; Walford, 
2014); and the commodification of the education system with the advent of corporate 
structuring (Ball, 2004, 2007; Connell, 2013; Husbands, 2016). However, with the exception of 
Hatcher (2008, 2011),  exposing how state-driven governance networks are designed to 
construct compliance and marginalise dissent, there is little that has been written about the 
power at play in the drive toward academisation. 
 
So, what are Academies? Unlike state maintained schools, Academies are outside the control 
of Local Education Authorities (LA), and are:  
 under direct contract with the Secretary of State for Education 
 permitted to prioritise up to 10% of the pupils by aptitude 
 free to disburse their funds as they wish 
 free to set their own pay and conditions for staff 
 and do not have to employ only those teachers with Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) 
In addition 
 new Academies must now join existing chains, encouraging the formation of large 
multi-academy trusts (MATs), in which schools can be 100s of miles apart 
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 hold large cash reserves - that are not being spent on raising standards of the 
education of children 
 
Academies were introduced in England in 2000 by a Labour Government, although their 
antecedents can be traced to City Technology Colleges (CTC) announced by Conservative 
Education Secretary Kenneth Baker in 1986. These were purported to develop enterprise, self-
reliance and responsibility, and broaden parental choice. Originally called City Academies in 
Labour’s Learning and Skills Act 2000, Academies were claimed to tackle social injustice by 
‘breaking the cycle of underperformance and low expectation’ of perceived to be failing inner 
city schools (Blunkett, 2010). But they have now come to be promoted as the only means of 
providing ‘outstanding’ education.  By January 2016, 65.5 percent of all secondary pupils and 
19.5 percent of primary pupils in England were attending academised schools (DfE, 2016: 3).  
 
The official discourse around Academies and Free Schools is one of providing excellence and 
addressing failure. In the UK it is likely that for the majority of people the word ‘academy’ will 
conjure an image of excellence and elitism. There is an association with societies or 
institutions ‘of distinguished scholars and artists or scientists [which] promote and maintain 
standards in [their] particular field: the Royal Academy of Arts’ (Oxford Dictionaries). The term 
‘free’ implies something that has been ‘unshackled’ or ‘liberated’ from something bad - in this 
case schools from the control of local authorities. And the latest offering in the proliferation 
of liberated schools, the Studio school, provides an impression of a creative institution. This 
false conceptualisation of Academies and Free Schools with ‘excellence’ and ‘creativity’ (given 
that there is little evidence that they are better than state maintained schools) contributes to 
the difficulty of exploring and exposing their weaknesses or the true direction of the policies 
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that have produced them. This is unsurprising; after all, who could oppose an Academy when 
academisation is framed as addressing failure. Such a narrative can create confusion in the 
public’s perception of the benefits of Academies, and may explain the lack of sustained 
momentum or cohesion between the various groups who resist academisation – be they 
parents, teachers, academics or others. 
 
The academisation of English state schools ‘is about major root and branch changes to the 
purposes of public education through dismantling the post-war settlement’ (Gunter, 2011: 1); 
it is underpinned by a market-oriented ideology which has sought to restore the dominance 
of the private sector. This world view sees the market approach as the most effective and 
efficient mechanism for resolving all the needs of society. The academisation process needs 
to be seen in light of the ‘learning economy’- serving a desire for market competitiveness and 
a skills-based agenda. As the former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair (1998) put it: ‘Education 
is the best economic policy we have’ (in Martin, 2003: 567). Under the ‘learning economy’ 
hegemony successive governments have viewed education as an important lever for 
economic growth and global competitiveness. Skills are equated with economic success. 
According to Hatcher,  
 
[t]he most fundamental legacy of the Blair government in school education in England is 
to have established the production of ‘human capital’ for the competitiveness of the 
British economy as the master narrative of policy (Hatcher 2008, 665).  
 
This contrasts with the social justice agenda which informed education policy before the 
1980s. It is only right that the future workforce should be equipped with ‘skills’ to keep pace 
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with the revolutions in technology affecting how we live and work, but the problem with this 
is that it is too narrowly viewed through the lens of science and technology. ‘Yet the challenges 
facing us today are as much human and societal as they are technical and scientific’ 
(Cannadine, 2017). 
 
The Political Capture of the Secret Garden 
 
Since the early 1980s the dominant trend within English education and training has seen 
successive governments having increased influence in the design, control and implementation 
of education policy (Keep 2006, 48). From having a limited and peripheral role in education 
and training prior to 1981, compulsory education in England has become one of the most 
centrally-controlled education systems in the world (Bassey, 2003). This has been matched by 
an unparalleled pace and scale of change since 1987 (Jenkins 1995 in Keep, 2006: 50). The 
weakening of education’s independence from political direction began in 1976 by the then 
Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan’s ‘Great Debate’ speech on education at Ruskin 
College, Oxford. Callaghan was addressing the Black Papers (published between 1969-1977). 
The Black Papers, though not opposed to progressive education, attacked its supposed 
excesses – and a perception that education was responsible for society’s problems.  
 
Prior to Callaghan’s speech the curriculum had been referred to, in 1960 by Conservative 
Education Minister David Eccles, as a ‘secret garden’ into which politicians should not seek to 
venture. This was a reflection and recognition of the intent of the 1944 Education Act, the first 
clause of which stated that while the minister has the ultimate responsibility for promoting 
education, the local education authorities and teachers would develop the content.  
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The 1960s are commonly assessed as marking a striking growth in teacher autonomy, 
especially in relation to the curriculum. ... [T]he received (and official view) of the 1960s 
was that the curriculum (or what went on in schools) was the specific responsibility of the 
teachers – not of the local authorities (though their role was unclear) and certainly not 
the state – or the central government (Simon 1991, in Bassey, 2003: 9). 
 
This was the consensus when it came to education: it was a no-go area for local and central 
government. However, in his ‘Great Debate’ speech, Callaghan suggested that no one could 
claim ‘exclusive right’ in the domain of education – that the teaching profession should not 
seek sole control of the ‘secret garden’ of the curriculum, and that there were other 
stakeholders (parents, industry and government) whose opinions were needed to address the 
question of formulating and expressing the purpose of education, as well as the standards to 
be met. His argument was that given everyone had some experience of education, everyone 
had something to contribute to the debate. Even though Callaghan was not interested in 
dismantling the comprehensive education system, his speech ushered in the era of testing, 
school league tables, and accountability as articulated by Cox and Boyson (1977: 8–10). 
Callaghan thus allowed politicians to claim a popular mandate for what they were doing, and 
it made education a much more partisan affair.  
 
Callaghan was right however: no-one should have sole ownership of education policy; 
education is far too important to be vested in the hands of a select few, expert or otherwise. 
However, 42 years on from his speech control of the ‘secret garden’ has transferred from 
education experts to politicians and their political agendas. Today it has become normal for 
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central government to interfere with the curriculum. This trend towards greater 
governmental control of education and training is paradoxical given that it began under a 
Conservative administration which, in pursuit of market-oriented ideals, was in favour of 
reducing the role of the state and sought greater emphasis on market-based solutions to 
public policy (Gamble 1994; Jenkins 1995, in Keep 2006). However, the only way to bring about 
this ideological shift was to entertain this paradox. 
 
Schools: the current push for Academisation  
 
The current drive for the academisation of the English state maintained schools represents 
the most radical change put forward by any government since the 1902 Education Act and has 
been achieved, I contend, without serious public debate. The case for full academisation of 
the English compulsory education system was made by Policy Exchange, a think tank set up 
by former Conservative Education Secretary Michael Gove, which advocated in its report 
Primary Focus (Briggs and Simons, 2014) that all primary schools should convert to Academies, 
and secondary schools should follow suit. Briggs and Simons, the authors, assert that it is the 
most effective way to combat the ‘perfect storm’ that is looming ahead: a fifth of primary 
school headteachers approaching retirement, cuts in funding, and the introduction of a 
rigorous new national curriculum and assessment systems, which will increase pressure on 
teachers. Part of this ‘perfect storm’ however is an exaggeration as at any given time about 




Under the Education and Adoption Act 2016 all schools rated ‘inadequate’ by Ofsted (the 
Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills - responsible for inspecting a 
range of educational institutions in England) will have to become an Academy. New powers 
will allow the Department of Education to change the leadership of failing schools and stop 
campaigners ‘obstructing’ takeovers. The former Education Secretary Nicky Morgan (Weale, 
2015) defined the concept of ‘coasting schools’ as those failing to ensure that 60% of pupils 
get five good GCSE grades (A* - C) including Maths and English. In addition, from 2016 schools 
are also to be judged on pupils’ progress from the beginning of secondary school to their 
GCSEs; any school not scoring highly on the government’s new accountability measure 
Progress 8 will also be classed as coasting. For primary schools the bar is even higher. Primary 
schools are required to ensure that 85% of 11-year-olds achieve a Level 4 in reading, writing 
and Maths - raised from the previous intervention threshold of under 65%, and a higher-than-
average proportion of pupils failing to make expected progress. In addition, summer 2016 saw 
the introduction of more rigorous Standard Attainment Tests (SATs), which meant the 
scrapping of the Levels classification, replacing them with children’s raw exam marks and 
comparisons with national averages as indicators of success/failure. 
 
The former Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s desire for zero tolerance on ‘failure’ 
and ‘coasting’ schools meant that even schools with the two highest ratings ‘good’ or 
‘outstanding’ by the Ofsted can be forced to become Academies. For Cameron: those ‘schools 
rated good at their last inspection – but which haven't been maintaining high standards since… 
are giving children “just enough” to avoid falling beneath our floor standards’ would be forced 
to become a sponsored Academy (TES Reporter, 2015). Such language I argue surreptitiously 
frames success into failure – for even a school rated outstanding must do more, and if not, it 
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could be regarded as ‘coasting’, and open to academisation.  
 
However, barely a year passed and the ground shifted again, with the government’s March 
2016 White Paper: Education, Excellence, Everywhere, which sought to force academisation 
on all remaining state maintained schools by 2022.  
‘The […] White Paper [was] a decisively centralising White Paper, placing enormous 
power in the hands of the secretary of state. The localism of 1902 and 1944, with 
their belief in local government, and of 1988, with its belief in parents, has been 
replaced by a faith in the corporate leadership of MATs’  (Husbands 2016).  
However, after much opposition especially from Conservative MPs and Conservative Local 
Councillors, the Government, in practice but not in ideology, back-tracked on forced 
academisation, and on 27 October 2016 dropped the Education Bill altogether, with Prime 
Minister Theresa May favouring grammar schools and selection, as opposed to forced 
academisation of all schools. 
 
Evidence for the success of Academies 
 
Considerable emphasis is given to the expectation that converting to Academy status will 
improve outcomes as a result of ‘establishing collaborative practices around teaching and 
learning, supporting teachers and individual school leaders to focus on what happens in 
classrooms, and supporting a culture of continuous improvement and development’ (Briggs 
and Simons, 2014: 10). But there are examples of excellent local authority (LA) maintained 
schools. So what prevents the Head Teachers of these schools from sharing their skills and 
expertise, or schools within different districts and boroughs from pooling their resources? 
 12 
Why can’t LA schools become part of federations? Rather than looking at governance 
structures, governments should look at the characteristics of good schools, and these are not 
bound by any particular form of governance.  But then this would undermine the official 
discourse on the advantages of becoming an Academy. Giving greater autonomy to Academies 
but not to maintained schools is deliberately denying those freedoms to maintained schools. 
The effect is to create an incentive for academisation in order to access greater freedoms.  
 
In his foreword to Primary Focus Sir David Carter, then Regional Schools Commissioner for the 
South West of England, says that over a period of 17 years to 2014, standards in primary 
schools had improved in Maths and English, from 67% (English) and 62% (Maths) of children 
attaining Level 4, to 89% and 86% respectively. However, because the Government has set 
higher standards from 2016, to 85% in each subject, the Primary Focus authors believe 
academisation is the best path to follow because they estimate ‘as many as 20% of schools 
would not have reached that level this summer.’ Anybody reading this would be befuddled: 
primary schools are currently achieving above government targets, yet the report estimates 
that 20% will fail! Briggs and Simons (2014: 10) even acknowledge that: ‘Academy status is not 
some sort of panacea’ which will automatically lead to improvements. But for them ‘it is clear 
that the creation of groups of schools collaborating together and sharing best practice is what 
is needed’; is this not spinning the truth to arrive at a conclusion which the evidence does not 
support? 
 
The research so far has not produced consistent findings.  Early reports were of modest but 
insignificant student progress (Machin and Wilson, 2009; PwC, 2008); however Worth (2015) 
found student progress in Academies to be no greater than in state maintained schools with 
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similar characteristics, and Angel Solutions (2016) found the opposite. Furthermore, the 
Education Select Committee in January 2015 states that: ‘Academisation is not always 
successful nor is it the only proven alternative for a struggling school (House of Commons 
Education Committee, 2015: 23), a point concurred with by Nick Gibb (2015), Minister of State 
for Schools. Moreover, Ofsted figures show that those schools which were rated inadequate 
are more likely to improve under their local authority than if forced to become an Academy.  
 
Privatisation through the back door? 
 
As Beckett (2007) argued ‘if there was a Government policy characterised by spin rather than 
substantial evidence, it is the academies programme’ - companies and rich individuals are 
persuaded to sponsor academies, with untruths being told in support of the academies 
project. Given the lack of evidence, there is a suspicion that the academisation of the English 
State school system represents a secret privatisation agenda, and the re-introduction of 
selection through the back door. This would fit in with the British Conservative Party’s ideology 
of the market as being the most effective and efficient form of providing society's needs. 
Stephen Ball (2004) asserts that current policy discourse idealises and romanticises the 
private, ‘while the bureau-professional regime of public welfare provision is consistently, and 
often unthinkingly, demonised.’ In this world view, state schools/universities are seen as 
‘value/commodity producing enterprises’ (Rikowski 2003, in ibid). At the school level, the 
emphasis of learning and teaching is attached to high-stakes testing, which comes at the 
expense of deep-knowledge learning, and to the homogenisation of curricula whose delivery 
is proscribed. Within this context, one can argue as Ball (2004) does, that educational 
processes are being rendered ‘into metric form, into comparable performances’ which serve 
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to order them 
 
into a form which is more readily privatised – that is, into a contractable form, into a form 
for cost and profit calculation, into a version of education which can be reduced to a 
commercial exchange based on output indicators, which can be monitored (ibid.) 
 
Let us now consider the evidence for a ‘privatisation’ agenda. On any broad definition of 
privatisation the reality of academisation structures look remarkably corporate, and the policy 
direction keeps open the possibility of wholesale privatisation of Academy Trusts. A precedent 
exists in Sweden’s friskola and US Charter Schools. Academies ‘are institutions that have been 
withdrawn from collective democratic accountability and delivered over into the power of 
individuals and unaccountable institutions’ (Wrigley 2009, 48). They are outside the control of 
Local Education Authorities, and because they are under direct contract with the Secretary of 
State for Education this means that it is easier for government to bypass local opposition, and 
hand out contracts to those organisations which fit its ideology. There is corporate structure 
which Ball (2013) argues is replacing local democratic oversight, and is radically changing our 
relationship to schools. A parallel exists with the now privatised utilities where, as customers, 
we can choose and change providers, and complain to a national watchdog when feeling 
aggrieved ‘but with no direct, local participation or involvement, no say in our children's 
education (ibid.).  
 
The Swedish privatisation of state schools may well act as a model for what recent 
Conservative governments have in mind further to full academisation and potential 
privatisation. Under the guise of choice, Sweden introduced an educational voucher system 
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(skolpeng) in 1992. This enabled private schools to compete for students with public schools 
on an equal financial basis and with full public funding (Blomqvist 2004, 147). The move, 
inspired by the ideas of Friedman (1962) and Chubb and Moe (1990) was promoted as 
improving choice. Within a very short period of time, the education system was transformed 
from one that was publicly run but with little parental choice, to one of the most (neo)liberal 
education systems in the world (Blomqvist 2004, 148). However, research (Björklund et al 
2005; Böhlmark and Lindahl 2007 and 2008, in Wiborg 2010, 14-15) has not been able to 
identify any positive effect of Free schools on greater educational attainment. Since the 
introduction of friskola, Sweden has seen a steep decline in its PISA rankings. This prompted 
the OECD in its report in May 2015 to recommend that Sweden undergo a root and branch 
education reform to restore its previously high educational standards. It is interesting to note 
that Finland, which nationalised all its schools and turned them into comprehensives over 
forty years ago, finds its students consistently ranked high in international comparisons such 




Influence of power 
 
How has academisation been achieved? To answer this question I will use Steven Lukes’ 
conceptualisation of power. One could argue that academisation is in fact about power and 
how power is exercised through policy and other routes. If one looks at the debate - or lack of 
it - around the academisation process one sees that those against academisation are thwarted 
at all stages of the process, and are made powerless. In 1974 Lukes, challenging Dahl (1961) 
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and Polsby’s (1963) idea of power, argued that power must be understood in terms not only 
of those who participate, but also of those who do not. For Lukes power has three dimensions: 
public or visible power, exercised through the use of political bodies, such as legislatures, local 
government bodies, local assemblies, or consultative forums; hidden power, which keeps 
issues off the agenda in decision making arenas (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962); and an insidious 
third, invisible power, through which the relatively powerless come to internalise and accept 
their condition. They might not be aware of nor act upon their interests. This insidious use of 
power prevents conflict from even arising. ‘[A] exercises power over [B] by influencing, 
shaping or determining his[/her] very wants’ (Lukes 1974, 27), through indoctrination, 
acculturation and socialisation. Moreover, power is exercised in part through control of the 
institutions that shape and create meaning (Hinson and Healey 2003, 4). Lukes’ invisible power 
is inspired by Gramsci’s ideas of hegemony and the manufacture of consent. Lukes’ 
conceptualisation of power is that of power as domination, characterised as power over. This 
contrasts with the alternative idea of power as empowerment, characterised as power to, as 
articulated by Arendt (1957 and 1970), Parsons (1963), Barnes (1988), and Searle (2007). For 
the purposes of this paper and due to the limitations of what can be substantively covered, I 
will concern myself with the idea of power as domination, by domination I mean obedience 
gained through compliance (Elias, 2000) rather than coercion, as I would characterise the 
relationship that exists between the British people and their government as power over.  
 
Although it is true that governments are elected by the people and if the people dislike their 
government, they can vote for change at the following General Election, nevertheless, with 
the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system, there has been a rule of the minority since 1945, 
as no party has gained over 50% of the votes cast. Recent governments have not sought to 
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build consensus for their policies, and matters are exacerbated by the increasingly executive 
style of government that exists in the UK, which has undermined parliamentary democracy. 
Liberal democracies such as that of the UK are representative democracies; but what happens 
when a representative democracy is unrepresentative and most of the power de facto is 
vested in the hands of the Executive? In such a climate there is very little the Legislature or 
the people can do to change government policy, especially if the government possesses a 
substantial parliamentary majority.  
 
Now, let us examine how the academisation debate is framed by government, and how this 
message is delivered. First, both Labour and Conservative governments have been keen to 
promote ideas of greater choice and autonomy for the population (see the Ministry of Justice 
Green Paper The Governance of Britain (2007) on devolving power to local government, and 
the people). Visible power is used to frame conversion to academies as strengthening local 
democracy: the Academies Act 2010 specifies that ‘before a maintained school in England is 
converted into an Academy, the school’s governing body must consult such persons as they 
think appropriate’ (my italics). However, hidden power is used to subvert this consultation 
process; evidence given to the Report on the MPs Committee of Enquiry into Academies and 
Trust Schools on January 12 2007 discloses ‘rushed, flawed and manipulated consultation 
processes with a complete disregard of [the] views’ of those against academisation. More 
worryingly there is evidence of Government itself trying to bypass consultation. For example, 
while Roke Primary School in Croydon was being primed for Academy conversion as part of 
the Harris chain, a letter sent from the Schools Minister, Lord Nash, to the local Conservative 
MP Richard Ottaway suggested parents, teachers and members of the local community would 
not be invited to give their views about the proposed conversion until after it had been agreed 
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by the Department of Education. Worse still, the consultation was permitted to be carried out 
by Harris, who stood to gain from its successful conclusion. Lord Harris has history. In June 
2007 he informed the Financial Times ‘I have a very good relationship with Andrew (Lord 
Adonis, then Schools Minister). He rings me and says, “Do you want this school?” and I ask 
what it’s like and if it sounds like the sort of place that we are interested in I say yes’ (cited 
Wrigley 2009, 47; see also Benn 2008 for further examples of lack of transparency). 
 
Second, the origins of academisation in England lie in the need to address ‘failing’ schools. 
From its inception, academisation has been about addressing failure. The use of hidden power 
has manipulated the debate by framing it around the idea that academisation is the only way 
to help failing schools. Here we see the hegemonic power (government) projecting its thinking 
upon the subordinated (citizens) to affirm the hegemonic ideology through false 
consciousness. The importance of language manipulation cannot be underestimated. 
Academies are associated with innovation and positivity; for example regarding the 
academisation of a school, the local Labour MP Siobhain McDonagh sent a questionnaire to 
the parents with the following tick box choices: 
 
o Yes, I am in favour of raising standards at Mitcham Vale Tamworth Manor High 
School by getting academy status. 
o No, I am against these changes to Mitcham Vale Tamworth Manor High School 
designed to improve examination standards (cited in Wrigley 2009, 58). 
 
This is a brazen attempt to manufacture consent by coding a positive response with the raising 
of standards, and negative response with a desire not to improve. Professing to develop only 
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evidence-based policies, David Blunkett the former Labour Education Secretary nevertheless 
forged ahead without waiting for the evidence expected from the PwC five-year evaluation 
study, asserting that: ‘We cannot wait five years for the study. These children only get one life 
chance and we can’t afford to wait that long before we make the radical break with the past, 
which academies represent’ (quoted in Beckett 2007, 37). This is exercise of visible ministerial 
power as it subverts parliamentary due process, given that the PwC study had been 
commissioned by the House of Commons Education and Skills Select Committee (2005). 
 
In addition, over time the concept of failure has been redefined and, in an example of visible 
power, the Education and Adoption Act 2016 will require all schools rated inadequate by 
Ofsted to become an Academy. The Act additionally extends the concept of failure to coasting 
schools, so that even schools performing well, but not improving, will be subject to 
compulsory academisation. This skilful use of hidden power to redefine the concept of failure 
implies that any school being converted must be a failing school. (It is interesting to note that 
no mechanism exists whereby a failing Academy may revert to local authority control). And 
any opposition to conversion will be negatively construed as an obstruction, and ignored. The 
effect of invisible power results in the acculturation of citizens to the belief that academisation 
is the only solution for failing schools. 
 
Furthermore, the government has introduced yet another way to define failure – by attaching 
the concept not only to schools but also to local authorities (LAs). The Education for All Bill 
(2016), which tried to move the goalposts further by requiring all state maintained schools to 
be forced to become Academies, has been shelved (for the time being). There is further 
skulduggery afoot: at primary school level only 2,440 of 16,766 schools currently have 
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Academy status. However, the recent introduction of more rigorous SATs exams for primary 
school children paves the way to classify schools as ‘underperforming’ and thus open to 
statutory academisation. I believe these new standards for SATs are a cynical attempt to 
guarantee ‘failure’ of primary schools, especially when these schools performed above the 
previous, government-set, standards in 2014. Last year’s ‘tough’ SATs results show that only 
53% of pupils passed (compared with 80% in 2015), the government expectation being 65% 
passing in each school (Richardson, 2016). Unfortunately, to discuss the effectiveness or 
otherwise of Academies using this form of ‘evidence’, is to fall into the trap of regarding the 
raising of standards as a uni-dimensional measure, i.e. attaining higher grades. 
 
Hidden power has also been employed to:  
 prevent conflict from arising, by controlling the terms of reference of the Academies 
Commission (Husbands et al., 2013). The Commission was not tasked to revisit the policy 
decisions to create and develop the Academies programme, ‘but rather to explore a future 
with a significantly or wholly academised system’ (ibid.)  
 ensure that consultation processes are restricted and manipulated to avoid the discussion 
of opposing views  
 promote the mobilisation of bias, by the creation of the think tank Policy Exchange to 
conduct research and give academisation a semblance of academic respectability  
 appoint individuals to strategic positions who share an ideology; for example, the chief 
inspector of Ofsted, Amanda Spielman, set up an Academy chain in 2004 and remains in a 
strategic role, but otherwise has no teaching qualifications 
 finally hidden power conveniently ignores evidence of socio-economic status as a factor 
in educational attainment and life chances (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2007). 
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Possible repercussions of power 
 
Foucault’s concept of ‘docile bodies’ (Discipline and Punish, 1979) says that people are and 
will be regulated in subtle, seemingly invisible ways leading to normalisation and acceptance 
of systems which do not promote their interests. This is done by governing the way that a 
‘topic’ (Academisation) can be ‘meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also 
influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others’ 
(Foucault, in Hall, 1997: 72). People are controlled by the invisible hand of hegemonic power 
(government) exercised through State apparatuses, civil institutions such as think tanks, the 
media and certain academics aligned to corporate interests, to shape and create meaning.  
 
In England, the purpose of education and schooling has changed without any ‘Great Debate’: 
education no longer seeks the cultivation of a person’s humanity, of promoting social 
solidarity. Instead it has become perfectly ‘common sense’ to view the purpose of education 
through the egotistical lens of the individual, the economic imperative, and as just another 
commodity.  ‘Despite it being known that affluence does not breed contentment (Offer, 2006) 
the UK Government is forcing these political dogmas about how to achieve growth and value 
from academic study into the student’s mindset’ (Holligan and Chiang, 2011).  
 
Under the above world view, teachers are seen as ‘deliverers’ of a curriculum, and need to be 
neither qualified nor experienced. Already, Academies and Free Schools are exempt from the 
obligation to employ teachers with Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) accreditation. Had the 
Education for All Bill (2016) not been dropped, it would have meant the accreditation of QTS 
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status would have been at the headteacher’s discretion; consequently, it would have become 
much easier and cheaper to hire unqualified teachers, and ‘train’ them. In the future one may 
well find a bank of lesson plans that anybody would be able to ‘deliver’ in a warm and pleasant 
manner (Holligan and Shah, 2017: 123). This is not far-fetched: an advocate of privatisation  
James Tooley, who runs schools in Africa, admits to hiring unqualified ‘teachers’ on low pay 
and that ‘we create everything they need centrally – lesson plans, workbooks, exercises – and 
give them a three-week crash course’ (Wilby, 2013).  
 
A further example of teachers becoming ‘deliverers’ is to be found in that case of Future 
Academies, an MAT set up by Lord Nash (a government Minister for Academies) and his wife. 
The Trust had engaged a History graduate (Jo Nash) – without teaching qualifications – not 
only to advise on the curriculum and to engage in the recruitment of teaching staff, but also 
to teach History. This unqualified teacher was also unpaid, and supported in her voluntary 
capacity by her parents – Lord and Lady Nash. At the same time Jo Nash remained on the 
parliamentary Register of Interests, in the office of Sir Iain Duncan Smith (a former 
government minister). In 2013 the same chain had engaged Annaliese Briggs, a 27-year-old 
head teacher, who subsequently joined the Policy Exchange think tank and co-authored the 
report Primary Focus.  
 
It is not inconceivable that the proposals in the Education for All Bill will reappear at some 
later stage. Such a devaluing of teaching practice is a reflection of the market ethos being 
imputed upon education: seeing it as just another commodity that simply needs to be 
packaged nicely and uniformly no matter the substance (an analogy with supermarkets and 
their push for aesthetics at the expense of taste can be made). Consequently, the weight of 
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‘success’ becomes defined in terms of examination results achieved by an individual, the 
professionalism of the teacher is seen through the narrow lens of what Giroux (1985) calls 
‘specialised technicians’ (bureaucrats) tasked with ‘managing and implementing curricula’ – 
‘deliverers’ of results - rather than as ‘transformative intellectuals’ – capable of combining 
reflection and practice; enabling students to be ‘thoughtful’. 
 
Possible societal consequences of Academisation 
 
Academisation raises the spectre of greater stratification of society and ethnic segregation, as 
evidenced in Sweden (Skolverket 1996, 2003, in Wiborg, 2010: 14). Lindbom and Almgren 
(2007, in ibid., 15) contest this and claim that housing is the single most important factor 
contributing to segregation, with Free schools accounting for only a very small proportion of 
increased school segregation. However, their claims are challenged by many other studies 
which identify greater segregation being attributable more to the result of school choice than 
to the effect of housing (Daun 2003; Arnman et al. 2004; Böhlmark and Lindahl 2007; 
Gustafson 2006, 2007; Bunar 2008, in ibid p, 14). In England there is already some evidence 
of academisation as a driver for segregation and selection (Green et al., 2015).  
 
Academisation has the potential to impact negatively on social cohesion. For example, when 
a proportion of an Academy school's intake (presently 10%) can be selected by ability, the 
definition of ability - and the contestability of that definition becomes important. Prime 
Minister Theresa May has a clear desire to introduce new grammar schools, and greater 
selection; ministers are encouraging Academies to set up more selective schools. Nick Gibb 
told Academy bosses that government proposals were ‘asking how some existing non-
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selective schools, including Academies, could become selective - if they wish.’ ‘Some of the 
schools in your trust may wish to introduce selection by ability.’ Or trusts ‘may consider 
establishing a new selective free school or you may look to expand using the routes that are 
already available’ (Gibb 2016, in Richardson, 2016). Furthermore, the idea of separate units 
for high-ability pupils is also under consideration. 
 
A shift towards greater selection by ability is supported by the switch from a binary pass/fail 
result at Key Stage 4 (KS4: assessing the two years of state maintained school education 
leading to and incorporating GCSEs and other examinations in England) to the publication of 
individual scores, either as a number or as a percentile of the national distribution of these 
results. This has opened the way for the development of classification systems to support 
selection criteria to individual secondary schools within a multi-academy trust (MAT). It is easy 
to envisage a system in which those schools available to a child will depend on the band into 
which their KS4 results sit - with such banding being set independently by each MAT. This has 
the potential to further compound societal stratification and social cohesion rather than 
enhance social mobility, especially given the situation in higher education. With rising tuition 
fees, and the prospect of debts akin to second mortgages, many working-class students are 
already dissuaded from studying at universities, especially as they lack the social capital to 
access the ‘lucrative employment opportunities […] available to the other social strata’ 
(Holligan and Chiang, 2011: 242). The Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 2015 
report found that in the UK, social mobility is lower than in most other comparable countries 
in the OECD.  
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Academisation arguably represents the privatisation of a public service (Ball 2007; Beckett 
2007, in Hatcher 2008, 21). It is a corporate takeover leading to what Ball (2003, in Holligan 
and Chiang, 2011) terms an ‘endogenous’ form of market-led remodelling, that is to say: the 
remnants of the public sector, metamorphosing into the values and identities of the corporate 
state. This radical shift in educational policy has taken effect without substantive debate 
taking place concerning the change. The dismantling of the national system of public schooling 
provided by the state ‘is beginning to resemble the patchwork of uneven and unequal 
provision that existed prior to the 1870 Education Act’ (Ball, 2013). This ideological push for 
the academisation of schools could lead to myriad organisations running state schools. It is 
only a matter of time before private providers will be given the opportunity to profit from 
running schools (as in Sweden and the US). Under the guise of parental choice, and greater 
school autonomy, academisation is undermining local democracy. If we are to go down the 
path of Sweden then there should be an open and transparent debate about the possible 
consequences of such a model, for the kind of schooling one receives has implications for 
one’s education. For example the narrow focus on skills and Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Mathematics in schools arguably comes at the expense of students’ moral and civic 
development. 
 
In some respects it could be argued that academisation represents the independence of 
education, free of political interference. However, the Swedish experience would suggest the 
consequence of academisation is not without cost: the raising of standards is not guaranteed, 
and in fact the opposite may be possible. Sweden again provides a worrying example: of 
bankruptcy. In 2013, JB Education, owned by the Danish private equity company Axcel, 
became bankrupt leaving a debt of $150 million. In England, who would foot the bill? And 
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what would happen to students and teachers whilst a new MAT was found to take over the 
affected schools? The failure of Perry Beeches Trust in Birmingham, once the leading light of 
academisation, raises such a spectre. The collapse of the trust due to serious financial 
mismanagement (EFA, 2015) leaves its five schools, with estimated debts of £1.8 million, 
facing an uncertain future while other MATs are found to take over the individual schools. 
 
With full academisation and corporatisation of schooling, it is not difficult to then see its actual 
privatisation, in which MATs are allowed to make a profit. The spectre also arises of what is 
offered as a curriculum being linked to the ability to pay. The Latymer School in north London 
has requested annual contributions from parents in order to maintain the subjects it offers 
(Adams, 2016). This school is not alone in seeking parental contribution for non-capital 
expenditure. This could lead to differentials in standards of education being provided to 
students. Such differentials would undermine the ethos ‘of entitlement to a broad and 
balanced curriculum for all pupils regardless of ability’, … [which was the purpose of 
comprehensive education] to provide common schooling ‘to all sections of society’ (Titcombe 




Academisation is ideologically driven by the market-oriented socio-politico-hegemony that 
has taken root in England since the 1980s. Academisation is a deeply contested field yet 
successive governments act as if the case for academisation has been made – a perfect 
example of the use of hegemonic power. It shows disregard for the wishes of citizens, and for 
the body of evidence against the perceived benefits of academisation. Those who exercise 
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hegemonic power in its different forms (visible; hidden; invisible) have sought to control and 
subvert the debate around the merits of academisation; redefining concepts of failure; 
marginalising those voices against it, and excluding them from the decision-making processes, 
or by offering only tokenistic consultation (Arnstein, 1969). This sense of powerlessness 
becomes internalised and seen as the ‘natural state’ of things. 
 
It would be wrong to pretend that education has ever been independent of powerful 
influences, nor do I advocate an education system divorced from society at large, run only by 
educational ‘experts’ for no single group can be trusted to safeguard an education that is truly 
free of ideological interference. British governments have a stranglehold over educational 
policy in England, and given the partisan nature of British politics this is bad for society. 
Decisions about education are taking place in a secret garden comprising the few, motivated 
by short-termism, political expediency and ideological preferences. Education is fundamental 
to the kind of society that we wish to create, and has implications for human rights, citizenship 
and democracy; education should not be treated like any other commodity, for unlike other 
commodities. It is neither easy to quantify nor to ‘succinctly specify … the good at the heart 
of […] education’ (Staddon and Standish, 2012: 635); nor should it ever be allowed to be 
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